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Abstract Historical accounts of biological are thought to have, as a point in their
favour, their being able to accommodate malfunction. Recently, this has been brought
into doubt by Paul Sheldon Davies’s argument for the claim that both selected mal-
function (that of the selected functions account) andweak etiologicalmalfunction (that
of the weak etiological account), are impossible. In this paper I suggest that in light
of Davies’s objection, historical accounts of biological function need to be adjusted to
accommodate malfunction. I propose a historical account which places two conditions
on membership of a functional kind. My claim is that it is in virtue of a trait’s meeting
these conditions that it is a member of a functional kind, and can thus malfunction.
I suggest that a version of my proposal can be adopted by both the selected effects
and weak etiological theorists, and so conclude that such a proposal meets Davies’s
objection.
Keywords Generic trait type · Selected functional type · Selected malfunction ·
Weak etiological malfunction · Selected functions
1 Introduction
Historical accounts1 of biological function play an important role in naturalistic the-
ories in the philosophy of mind and language. For example, notions of function are
1 References to historical accounts should be taken to refer to both strong (selected functions) and weak
etiological accounts. When referring to those accounts in particular I will use these terms.
B Ema Sullivan-Bissett
e.l.sullivan-bissett@bham.ac.uk
1 Department of Philosophy, College of Arts and Law, University of Birmingham,
ERI Building, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
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drafted into teleosemantic accounts of mental content (Millikan 1989a; Neander 1995;
Papineau 1987). The teleosemantics program provides a naturalistic account of mental
representation by appeal to biological function; truth conditions of intentional states
are given in terms of what those states are supposed to do (Macdonald and Papineau
2006, p. 1). In putting forward an account ofmental contentwhich appeals to biological
function, one had better have an independent account of that notion. Equally one had
better allow for malfunction in their account of function, to ground misrepresentation.
Historical accounts of function have been thought able to do this important work, and
are the choice accounts for philosophers seeking naturalistic theories in the philosophy
of mind and language.
However, in several places, Davies launches a systematic attack on the historical
account of function, calling it a ‘failed theory’, which ‘does not have the virtues
that advocates claim for it’ (Davies 2001, p. 32), and has ‘rather little […] worth
preserving’ (Davies 2001, p. 39). More specifically, he objects to approaches which
seek to account for malfunction, and suggests that as naturalists, we ought to do away
with the notion of malfunction altogether. Here I address the argument against the
possibility of historical malfunction, as presented in Davies’s paper ‘Malfunctions’
(2000) and his bookNorms of Nature (2001). Davies’s argument teaches us something
important about how historical accounts need to be formulated if they are to avoid
the ‘internal failing’ of being unable to accommodate malfunction (2001, p. 192). He
makes a plea for ‘an argument for the oft-repeated assertion that selected or etiological
malfunctions are possible’ (2000, p. 21). I give such an argument (§5). I am not
pursuing themore ambitious project of giving an account ofmalfunctionwhichDavies
would accept, since he does not think there is any such phenomenon to give an account
of. Rather, I seek to show that an historical approach need not suffer from an internal
failing to account for malfunction. I am not addressing Davies’s wider aim which
is to take norms out of nature altogether, thus eschewing the notion of malfunction
simpliciter. I am addressing the objection that the failure to account for malfunction
is an internal failing of historical accounts.
As well as offering a revised historical account to meet Davies’s objection, I make
two additional and related points. First, I argue that the scope of Davies’s objection
is limited. Davies is wrong to claim that historical accounts cannot accommodate
malfunction, it is only malfunction due to congenital factors which is problematic
(§4). Second, I identify an inherent and under explored commitment in the work of (at
least some) historical theorists (§5.1). It is by bringing this commitment to the fore,
and taking a lesson from Davies’s objection, that I offer a historical theory of function
which possesses the internal resources required for giving an account of malfunction.
Before getting into the topic of the paper, it is worth reflecting briefly on the appro-
priate methodology for a philosophical analysis of biological function. Two projects
should be distinguished, which are distinct, and may be pursued independently. Each
brings different adequacy conditions on accounts of function—an account of function
may in principle be adequate for one project whilst being inadequate for the other. This
does not call either project or account into question, but rather shows that different
accounts of function are needed to subserve different theoretical goals.
The first project is driven by philosophy of biology, and the attempt to understand
actual cases of biological research. Such an account will be adequate if and only if
123
Synthese
it is genuinely illuminative of actual cases in biology. The second project is driven
by broadly naturalistic considerations within philosophy of mind and language. An
account of function designed to serve this project is a theoretical one, adequate if and
only if it fulfils the needs of philosophical accounts in these areas. Since, for example,
our best naturalistic accounts of mental representation appeal to biological function,
and since these accounts appeal to historical functions, Davies’s attack on historical
accounts constitutes a real threat to some naturalistic projects in philosophy.
In an incisive paper on the debate over the correct characterisation of biological
function, Arno Wouters notes that the recent revival of the philosophical debate on
function canbeput down to an interest in developingnaturalistic theories like these, and
not an interest in biology or biological practice (Wouters 2005, p. 123). Philosophers
engaged in such projects differ on how they view their accounts of functionwith respect
to whether they are—or should be—in line with actual biological practice. Karen
Neander takes her account to be in step with actual biological practice, defending it
as conceptual analysis (Neander 1991a). Ruth Millikan on the other hand is clear that
she is not engaging in conceptual analysis (1984, p. 18; 1989b, p. 290). Reflecting on
earlier work in which she first laid out her account of function, she notes that the point
of her notion of proper function ‘was/is mainly to gather together certain phenomena
under a heading or category that can be used in the construction of various explanatory
theories’ (Millikan 1989b, p. 289). She intends her notion of function to be a theoretical
definition, one which is able to ‘describe a unitary phenomenon that lies behind all the
various sorts of cases in which we ascribe purposes or functions to things’ (Millikan
1989b, p. 293). The idea is to offer a theoretical notion of biological function, and
then we can decide if it earns its keep by seeing how much theoretical work it can do.
Participants in the function debate then take themselves to be up to rather different
things. If one is interested in how best to understand function attribution in biology, I
agree with Wouters that one ought to focus one’s attention on the ‘actual practice of
biological inquiry’ (2005, p. 123). However, if one is interested rather in a program
like Millikan’s, then one has no such obligation, though one is advised that getting
clear on the correct notion of function in this sense will provide ‘little insight in real
biology’ (Wouters 2005, p. 123). I am engaging in the second kind of program, and
so those philosophers of biology who think that the philosophical notion of function
should be in line with actual biological practice may not find much of interest in
this paper. However, for those philosophers who are interested in biological function
as an explanatory notion which can play a central role in naturalistic theories in the
philosophy of mind and language, the work here can be taken as developing a notion
of biological function in this sense. Although I think Davies is right that the best
extant historical accounts of biological function cannot accommodate all cases of
malfunction, I provide a historical account which can.
2 The normativity of function and the historical account
Much of the biological function debate has been concerned with accounting for the
supposed normativity of functionally characterized items or function statements. An
account of function’s ‘main task […] is to explain how this norm arises in biological
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contexts’ (Wouters 2005, p. 125), this seems indeed to be the ‘fault line running
through [the function] debate’ (McLaughlin 2001, p. 4). Often what the function
theorist’s burden comes down to is the requirement to accommodate malfunction.
Malfunctions are taken to be ‘ubiquitous’ (Davies 2000, p. 20). Millikan claimed
of function categories that it is an ‘obvious fact’ that ‘their members can always be
defective—diseased, malformed, injured, broken, dysfunction, etc.,—hence unable to
perform the very functions by which they get their names’ (Millikan 1989b, p. 295).2
Carolyn Price claims that it cannot be inferred ‘from the fact that an item has a certain
function that it will tend to perform that function: the device may be defective, or the
environment in which it operates may not cooperate’ (Price 2001, p. 13).
How can we understand the thought that there is something that biological items
are supposed to do, that biological items can fail to do what they are supposed to do,
that they can malfunction?
Historical accounts look promising. Indeed, it is a ‘persistent boast’ (Davies 2000, p.
19) of this approach, or ‘perhaps the grandest’ of its claims, that it can provide ‘a clear
and compelling naturalistic explanation for the occurrence of malfunctions’ (Davies
2001, p. 190). Furthermore, it is claimed by proponents that only a historical account
can do this work, Millikan says that this is because non-historical accounts ‘run afoul
exactly when they confront the most central issue of all, namely, the problem of what
failure of purpose and defectiveness are’ (Millikan 1989b, p. 299). She claims that ‘a
crippling defect of any definition that looks for function in current dispositions rather
than history is that such definitions cannot ground the notion of malfunction’ (Mil-
likan 1993a, p. 32). This is a serious flaw for non-historical theories since ‘[f]unction
categories are essentially categories of things that need not fulfil their functions in
order to have them’ (Millikan 1989b, p. 296).
Proponents of historical accounts claim that a certain historical connection to prior
tokens of a trait is necessary and sufficient for a trait’s being a member of a functional
kind. This connection sets the norms on proper functional performance, that is, ‘being
preceded by the right kind of history is sufficient to set the norms that determine
purposiveness’ (Millikan 1989b, p. 299). Biological traits have functions ‘whether or
not [they are themselves] capable of serving any of these functions’ (Millikan 1993b,
2 There is an important distinction between an item failing to perform its function, and an item malfunc-
tioning. In later work, Millikan is more doubtful about whether anything falls into this second category,
and so she thinks that the selected functions account need not concern itself with accounting for malfunc-
tioning items—this work can be done by appeal to abNormal conditions (a ‘Normal condition’ [note the
capitalization] is a condition which must be mentioned in a description of the proper performance of an
item’s function (Millikan 1984, p. 33). Compare: spermNormally fertilize ova, with sperm normally fertilize
ova—the first is true, the second is false). So we should not say that an item is malfunctioning, rather we
should say that an item is failing to perform its function because conditions are abNormal. Given this story,
Millikan thinks that malfunction proper is actually very rare (if indeed it happens at all), and that an item
failing to perform its function is the ‘usual case’ (personal correspondence). (See Millikan (1997) for the
first statement of this view, and more recently, see Millikan (2013, p. 40).)
This will be important later when I discuss the differences betweenmy account andMillikan’s (§5.2). For
now I will just note that theorists differ on the extent to which malfunction is possible, and its prevalence.
For those who think it is possible, and that it is something which an account of biological function ought
to accommodate, I offer an account which can do so. The point here is to show that a historical account
can—if necessary—accommodate malfunction.
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p. 56). A trait can make no causal contribution to fitness, but it nevertheless still has
something that it is supposed to do (Neander 1991b, p. 459, fn. 7).
Davies claims that from a naturalistic perspective, it is difficult to see ‘how or
why we should think that the processes that result in trait preservation confer upon
descendent tokens a norm of performance’ (Davies 2001, p. 67, see also 2009, pp.
139–42). I will give an historical account which has the internal resources to lay down
this standard, from which token traits can deviate.
3 The supposed impossibility of selected malfunction
Davies’s argument for the claim that historical malfunctions are impossible is, in
summary:
If functional types are defined in terms of historical success, then tokens that
lack the defining property due to defect, and tokens that have lost the defining
property due to disease or damage, are excluded from the functional category.
Historically based malfunctions, in consequence, are impossible. (Davies 2000,
p. 19)
I will look first at Davies’s objection as applied to the selected functions account as
this is its primary target; the argument is applied to the weak etiological account only
derivatively.
Davies considers the following account of selected functions. He claims that
selected function theorists are committed to these conditions, or equivalents of them.
For organism O and trait T, in selective environment E, the function in E of T in O is
to do F if and only if:
(i) Past instances of T in O performed F in E,
(ii) T was heritable,
(iii) Past performances of F caused an increase in O’s relative ability to satisfy
demands of E (relative to other organisms in the population lacking T),
(iv) This increase in O’s ability to satisfy selective demands of E resulted in an
increase in O’s long-term relative rate of reproduction,
(v) This increase in relative reproduction resulted in the persistence or proliferation
of O and hence tokens of T. (Davies 2000, p. 22)
To prevent the ascription of functions to vestigial traits, Davies revises the characteriza-
tion of the selected functions account so that conditions on a trait’s having a function
appeal to ‘genealogical descent from a recently successful lineage’ (Davies 2000,
p. 25, my emphasis). Davies then characterizes the selected functions account thus:
A token of trait T has selected function F if and only if the token is descended
from a lineage perpetuated by the recent selective efficacy with which ancestral
members performed F. (Davies 2000, p. 25)
Conditions (i)–(v) refer to recently successful ancestral tokens of T. Finally, Davies
stresses that ‘conditions under which a token trait has a selected function definitely do
not include possession of the capacity required to actually perform the functional task’
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(Davies 2000, p. 25). This is of course granted by, and indeed is one of the insights
of, historical accounts.
Davies distinguishes generic trait types from selected functional types. The former
includes all traits which are apt for selection. The latter includes only those variants of
a given generic trait type which are selectively successful, that is, those which possess
the property selected for. In the oft-cited case of Bernard Kettlewell’s (1973) peppered
moth3 for example, the targeted trait is wing colouration, and this is the generic trait
type. The successful variant of this type is a particular wing colour, and it is this which
is the selected functional type.
What kind of trait type does clause (v) concern? This is important: if tokens of T
in (v) are members of the generic trait type only, then the selected functions account
can accommodate malfunction, because the generic trait type will include instances
of the trait which are not selectively successful. So, tokens of T cited in (v) could
refer to successful tokens, or unsuccessful (i.e., damaged or diseased) tokens. And the
latter, which would qualify as malfunctioning tokens, are nevertheless still part of the
functional category. This would be a good result for the selected functions theorist.
However, Davies claims that because tokens of T in (i)–(iv) refer to those tokens
which possessed the properties which were selected for and are thus members of
both the generic trait type and the selected functional type, so too—on pain of
equivocation—must be tokens of T in (v). Tokens of T in (v) must refer not just to
members of the generic trait type, but to members of the narrower selected functional
type. This means that ‘membership in a selected functional category, per condition
(v), requires possession of the property selected for’ (Davies 2000, p. 28). It follows
that current incapacitated tokens do not belong to the relevant functional types because
they lack the capacity which defines that type, despite being descended from a recently
successful lineage.
As a result of this, the selected effects account needs to be revised thus:
A token of trait T has selected function F if and only if (1) the token is descended
from a lineage perpetuated by the recent selective efficacy with which ancestral
members performed F, and (2) the token possesses the property selected for in
terms of which the relevant functional category is defined. (Davies 2000, p. 30)
On this formulation, the selected functions account cannot accommodate malfunction.
This is because if ‘due to some sort of defect, disease, or damage the token of trait
T lacks the property selected for, then it is merely a member of the generic type,
not the functional type’ (Davies 2000, p. 30). If this is the case, norms of functional
3 Before 1850, nearManchester, tree trunks roosted on by pepperedmothswere lichen-covered. Thismeant
that those moths with light coloured wings were protected through camouflage, from predation from birds,
whilst moths with dark coloured wings were heavily preyed upon. Then industrial soot destroyed the lichen,
resulting in a darkening of the tree trunks. By the end of the nineteenth century, the selective successes of
the moths had been reversed. Now the dark coloured winged moths were protected from predation, and the
light coloured winged moths were exposed to it. Whereas before 99 % of the peppered moth population had
light coloured wings, now 99 % of the peppered moth population had dark coloured wings (see Kettlewell
1955, 1958). Such results were not specific to Manchester, rather there was a ‘correlation between the
frequencies of the melanic forms and the industrial areas of Britain’ (Kettlewell 1958, p. 58).
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performance do not apply to such tokens. Davies concludes that selected malfunctions
are impossible.
We can think of Davies as offering a dilemma. On the first horn, if tokens of T in
(i)–(v) refer to members of the generic trait type, then the selected functions account is
extensionally incorrect. On the second horn, if tokens of T in (i)–(v) refer to members
of the selected functional type, then the account cannot allow for malfunction. Either
way, the account is inadequate. I will argue later that this is a false dilemma, since
there is another notion of type, more inclusive than selected functional type, but less
inclusive than generic trait type. Once we appeal to this more inclusive type, the
selected functions account can accommodate malfunction without being extensionally
incorrect, since membership of this type is compatible with a trait lacking the capacity
to perform the relevant function (§5). Before then, it is worth noting that the scope of
Davies’s objection is limited, as I will now show.
4 A note on the scope of the objection
Despite Davies’s view that his objection undermines all historical attributions of mal-
function, the scope of his objection is much narrower. Even the unmodified selected
functions account can in fact accommodate certain kinds of malfunction. Only when
traits are unable to perform their function as a result of congenital factors does a prob-
lem arise.4 This is because conditions (i)–(v) refer to the very existence of a given
token, and, as we have seen, a trait belongs to a given selected functional type only if
it has the success property for being able to perform its proper function.
However, the set of congenitally damaged token traits is not co-extensive with the
set of malfunctioning token traits. Malfunction does not require congenital disease or
defect.5 Davies claims that ‘it is difficult to see what in the theory of selected functions
or in the theory of weak etiological functions justifies the claim that functions persist
even when the physical capacity is lost’ (Davies 2000, p. 20). Also, as we saw in his
summary of the objection, tokens can ‘lack the defining property due to defect’ and they
can ‘[lose] the defining property due to disease or damage’ (Davies 2000, p. 19). Here
we see that Davies took his objection to apply to traits which malfunctioned not as a
result of congenital disease or damage. Indeed, he claims that ‘an incapacitated token of
T isno longer amember of the category ofTs’ (Davies 2001, p. 199, n. 6,my emphasis).
Even if congenitally damaged traits are not malfunctioning ones because they are
excluded from the selected functional category, it does not follow that environmentally
4 There is of course a question about whether all of these kinds of cases will be due to abNormal conditions,
rather than malfunction (see fn. 2). I suspect Neander would think that these cases are cases of malfunction,
whereasMillikanwould say that they are cases ofmere failure to perform, due to conditions being abNormal
for proper functional performance.
5 See also Maarten Franssen’s argument against Davies. Franssen takes issue with Davies’s reading of
conditions (i), (iii), and (iv) of the selected effects account, on the grounds that Davies reads them as applying
to every token of T (i), or every organism (iii) and (iv). He suggests, following Neander (1991a, p. 174)
that the ‘causal explanation of the selection does not require the positive contribution of every historical
possessor of tokens of the type corresponding to the selection of the genotype’ (Franssen 2009, p. 108).
This means that we can appeal to the average contribution of tokens of T, and so tokens of T in (v) can be
malfunctioning ones.
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damaged traits are excluded from the selected functional category too. It follows only
that a necessary condition on function possession is that the trait in question started
with the capacity to perform the function. To claim necessity for continued possession
of that capacity is too strong, or at least, it is not something we can arrive at from
Davies’s argument.
The selected functions account can accommodate token traits which had the success
property, and were able to perform their function, but now, due to damage or disease,
are unable to do so6 (I will call these cases of environmental malfunction, as opposed
to congenital malfunction). These token traits meet the condition put in place by the
selected functions account—they hold the appropriate historical connection with pre-
vious reproductively successful token traits. Additionally, these token traits meet the
condition put in place by Davies—they possessed the capacity to perform their func-
tion. They thus count as members of the selected functional type. If they subsequently
fail perform their function because, for example, they lose the property which granted
themmembership into the selected functional type, then they malfunction. This means
that traits which start as members of the selected functional type but later are unable
to perform their function, count as malfunctioning. These will be items such as hearts
which become unable to pump blood or pancreases which become unable to produce
sufficient insulin.
Here is aworrywithmy argument: to say that tokenswhich had the success property
but then lose it due to damage or disease, malfunction, is simply an un-argued denial
of Davies’s challenge. For Davies, membership of a selected functional type requires
possession of the success property for that type. Just as tokens which do not have
that property from the off do not qualify as members of the selected functional type,
so too do tokens which had the property and then subsequently lose it not qualify
as members of the selected functional type. My response to Davies succeeds only
because I assume a less strict condition on selected functional type membership than
Davies would accept (namely, that a trait merely start with the success property).7
This objection fails. Tokens of ‘T’ in the selected functions theorist’s conditions
on function possession had better refer—on pain of equivocation—to the same kind
of thing throughout. And those tokens of ‘T’ had better refer to tokens which actually
had the capacity to perform the function, or some success property which enabled
the function to be performed. However, Davies adds the further claim that if a token
was a member of the selected functional type, and had the success property, then if
it subsequently loses that property (and the capacity to perform the function) due to
damage or disease, that token is no longer a member of the relevant selected functional
type. The selected functions theorist need not accept this. She is forced to accept that
tokens of ‘T’ in her five conditions had better refer to tokens with the success property
6 This ‘due to damage or disease’ qualifier is crucial. It is not my position that every case of loss of
function-relevant capacities is a case of malfunction (consider non-infant humans’ loss of the instinct to
suckle, this is not a case of a suckling malfunction). We can appeal to Normal conditions to principally
distinguish function loss as malfunction from function loss as failure to perform a function in abNormal
conditions. The conditions in which a non-infant human finds itself are conditions which are abNormal for
the performance of the suckling function, and so this loss of function-relevant capacities is not a case of
malfunction. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for seeking clarification on this point.
7 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
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(to avoid equivocation), but she need not accept that those tokens need to retain the
success property to remain part of the relevant type. This is Davies’s position, but
it is not one the selected functions theorist is forced into, and it is not something
Davies argues for. Absent positive argument for the more restrictive account, selected
functions theorists are free to reject this additional claim. Continued possession of
the success property is not something which is required for conditions (i)–(v) to be
coherent, and of course, it is something historical theorists are wont to deny.
However, if the selected functions theorist has only this to say, her victory is Pyrrhic.
Congenital malfunction is an important kind of malfunction, which a fully adequate
account should accommodate. When selected functions theorists discuss malfunction,
they often cite examples which are plausibly—at least in some cases—congenital.
Millikan talks of members of functional categories which are ‘diseased, malformed,
injured, [and] broken’ (Millikan 1989b, p. 295), and Neander talks of items exhibiting
‘pathological deviations from the norm, due to disease, injury or deformity’ (Nean-
der 1991b, p. 467). Millikan and Neander (among others) thus appear to be seeking
an account which can accommodate both environmental malfunction and congenital
malfunction (there is certainly no evidence to suggest otherwise). Further, it could
well be that environmental malfunction is not sufficient for the kind of project that,
for example, teleosemanticists are engaged in. Davies’s objection therefore remains.
A more robust response is required.
5 A new historical account of function
Here I give a historical account which can accommodate malfunction (including con-
genital malfunction). Davies argues that the tokens of ‘T’ cited in (v) have to refer
to members of the selected functional type on pain of equivocation, as tokens of ‘T’
cited in earlier conditions refer to members of the selected functional type. However,
we do not have to accept that the only referent of ‘T’ is Davies’s proposed selected
functional type, a type characterised by possession of the success property for func-
tional performance. Instead we can have tokens of ‘T’ in conditions (i)–(iv) referring
to members of the selected functional type, and have tokens of ‘T’ in condition (v)
referring to members of what I will call the historical trait type. What does it take
for a token trait to be a member of some historical trait type? I propose placing two
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on function possession and membership of
the historic trait type, such that it is possible for the items which meet them to mal-
function. To be a member of the historical trait type is to be a member of the functional
kind. Membership of a historical trait type (a functional kind), and being ascribable a
function, supervene on the same facts (the ones cited in conditions (a) and (b) below).
Evolution does not just target features that construe selective advantages. It tar-
gets the underlying heritable physical configuration responsible for possession of the
survival-enhancing feature. It is that physical configuration which is primarily heri-
table hence selectable; the survival enhancing feature is only heritable derivatively,
by virtue of heritability of the physical feature that gives rise to it. Moreover, there
may be more than one such physical state that gives rise to the feature—that is a
form of multiple realizability. However, possession of the physical feature need not
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necessitate possession of the survival-enhancing one. If membership of the kind goes
in part with possession of the physical feature, then membership of the kind will then
be compatible with lack of survival-enhancing feature (or performance of the function
which defines the functional type). My proposal is the following: functional kinds are
associated with sets of properties and particular functions. A token trait t is a member
of the functional kind K and has F-ing as its selected function if and only if it:
(a) Possesses one of a set S of intrinsic structural properties, {p1, p2, p3, . . ., }
(b) Stands in a causal historical relationship to at least one token trait which
i. possessedoneof a set S of intrinsic structural properties, {p1, p2, p3, . . ., }
ii. possessed one of a set S∗ of properties responsible for that token trait
F-ing, {q1, q2, q3, . . ., }
iii. was selected for F-ing.
Where selection for requires variation, in line with the selected functions theorist’s
claim that functions are attributed to traits on the basis ofwhat they didwhich ‘accounts
for [their] presence in the population, as over against historical alternative traits no
longer present’ (Millikan 1993a, p. 40). If a token trait meets the conditions set out
here, it is a member of a historical trait type (and a functional kind), and can be
attributed a function in the usual way, that is, by looking to its history. Note here that I
have moved from talking about the selected functional type, as is Davies’s preference,
to talking of the historical trait type, as is mine. In the next two sub-sections I will
say more about the details of these conditions. Explication of condition (a) will take
up the most space here, since the positing of a disjunctive set of properties as required
for function possession is a large part of what is novel about my approach.
5.1 Condition (a)
Condition (a) picks out a class of intrinsic structural properties. What is required is
a set which captures those properties which are possessed by all items to which a
particular function would be ascribed, but are not possessed by items which would be
ascribed a different function (namely, different traits), or no function at all (namely,
severely malformed organic stuff). Here is a rough (and simplified) approximation of
oneway the historical theorist might go in pinning down the nature of this set (note that
I offer this as one way, there are no doubt numerous ways tied in with the production
of functional traits which might delineate the set of properties in (a)).
We could appeal to an appropriate range of gene expression associated with recent
ancestral items which performed F . By gene expression, I mean to refer to the process
through which information contained within a gene is used in the creation of a gene
product (e.g. a protein). To qualify as a member of a functional kind K , with the func-
tion of F-ing, a token trait t must have been produced by appropriate gene expression,
that is, within a range considered a reasonable attempt to produce an item similar
to ancestral items which performed F . This set of otherwise heterogeneous intrinsic
structural properties cited in (a) can be picked out by an appeal to an appropriate
range of allowed departures from the genetic development of ancestral items which
performed F. This is just to say that there is some set of properties for each functional
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kind, members of that set may be rather different from one another, but they can be
identified as a set by appeal to an appropriate range of departures from the genetic
development of ancestral items which performed F . The idea is that the set of intrinsic
structural properties cited in (a) delineate a multiply realizable kind. Past instances of
this kind are selected for in virtue of their role in the production of items which were
able to perform the function of F-ing, which is adaptive (they might, for example,
possess property p1, or p2). This is compatible with malfunction because not every
way of realizing this kind needs to be in an F-ing contributing way (some realiza-
tions of the kind might be in virtue of possessing property p3, or p4. These properties
are within a range of allowed departures of gene expression associated with ancestral
selectively successful items). Evolution chooses between intrinsic properties, function
attribution is licensed when these intrinsic properties start to have relational functional
properties, that is, when condition (b) is met.
I should say something about my use of the terms ‘appropriate range’ and ‘reason-
able attempt’. These terms are of course metaphorical insofar as natural selection does
not attempt anything. Talk in these terms is intended to be helpful in capturing those
traits which come pretty close to being well functioning members of a given kind, but
nevertheless go awry. That is, those traits for which something goes awry (as in the
case of Holt-Oram syndrome below), but does not go awry enough to disqualify it
from the functional kind (as in the case of what might be best described as ‘glob[s]
of misplaced organic matter’ (Millikan 1984, p. 25)). For a token trait to qualify as a
member of the functional kind heart, we can usefully talk in terms of its being pro-
duced within a range considered a ‘reasonable attempt’ to produce something of that
kind. How wide is this acceptable range? That will depend on what physical features
are selected by natural selection, and that is not something we can pronounce on a
priori. The thought is that evolution targets underlying physical structures by virtue
of their producing certain traits that confer reproductive advantages. More than one
structure or set of properties will be associated with the development of each of these
traits. Exactly what counts as the acceptable range is determined by that. This vague-
ness and imprecision in our language for characterising the set S associated with kind
K and function F need not reflect any vagueness or imprecision in actual concrete
cases. It is just a by-product of needing a single term to cover the proposal’s structure
in abstraction from any given case.8
Although admittedly somewhat vague in the abstract, its application in the following
case study is hopefully sufficiently clear and precise to alleviate doubts arising from
that. Here I run through an example of the genetics of the development of the human
heart to show my account at work. The development of the human heart is extremely
complicated, and something I cannot do justice to in this short foray into the genetics
of this process.9 In addition, the genetics of the human heart is a relatively young field,
and one which is quickly changing (Pierpont et al. 2007, p. 3015). Let us say that the
genetic processes involved in the production of a human heart can produce an array
8 I am grateful to two anonymous referees for encouraging an explanation of my language here, and to
Nicholas Jones for helpful discussion.
9 See Marc Sylva et al. (2014) for an excellent step-by-step description of human heart development,
especially helpful to the uninitiated!
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of traits which will fall into one of three categories: working, defective, and what I
will call useless (i.e., Millikan’s ‘globs’). Our appeal to the set of intrinsic structural
properties demarcates working and defective traits from useless traits, with those in
the former two categories meeting condition (a) on membership of the functional
kind heart. Such categories will be roughly correlated with the expression of genes
which fall into the range considered a reasonable attempt to produce an item similar
to ancestral items which pumped blood, and will group together working pumps and
defective pumps. And so-called useless traits—excluded from the functional kind—
will correlate roughly with the expression of genes associated with the production
of ancestral items which pumped blood, but which fall outside of the range of gene
expression considered a reasonable attempt to produce such an item.
Take an example of a defective heart, one which my account would classify as a
malfunctioning member of the functional kind human heart. The underlying genetic
basis for many heart defects is not known, but what has been found is that mutations in
those genes encoding core cardiac transcription factors are involved in many forms of
congenital heart disease (McCulley andBlack 2012, p. 254). In particular, transcription
factorsNKX2–5,GATA4, andTBX5have been identified as playing central roles in the
development of the heart, andmutations in these genes are involved in congenital heart
disease (McCulley and Black 2012, p. 254, see also Pierpont et al. 2007 for analysis
of congenital heart defects associated with single gene mutations). For example, in
patients with structural malformations of the heart, mutations in NKX2–5 have been
found (McCulley and Black 2012, p. 257, see alsoMcElhinney et al. 2003). In cashing
out how condition (a) might apply, I will look at the role of the TBX5 gene in Holt-
Oram syndrome.
Holt-Oram syndrome, also known as ‘heart-hand syndrome’, occurs in around
0.001 % of the population. It is a condition characterised by deformities in the upper
limbs and congenital heart defects (Pierpont et al. 2007, p. 3024). Research on this
syndrome has revealed that it is caused by mutations in a single gene: TBX5,10 one of
the three genes identified above as playing a central role in human heart development
(see for example Basson et al. 1997; McDermott et al. 2005; Li et al. 1997). Most
of such mutations in this gene prevent the production of the T-box 5 protein which
activates genes involved in the normal development of the upper limbs and the heart.
Studies on the role of TBX5 in Holt-Oram syndrome have shown that decreased activ-
ity of this gene is responsible for septal defects (most commonly in the wall separating
the left and right sides of the heart) (Basson et al. 1997, p. 33). I focus on this example
for simplicity’s sake, since little genetic heterogeneity is found among patients with
Holt-Oram syndrome11 (Pierpont et al. 2007, p. 3025). In this syndrome, we have an
10 The full(er) story: The TBX5 gene encodes T-box 5 protein, a transcription factor which goes on to
regulate the expression of other genes (and so proteins produced by other genes). A mutated TBX5 gene
may produce a changed protein, which cannot activate a subset of genes required for heart development,
which results in heart defect. This changed protein though may be able to activate genes required for lung
development, so mutations in the TBX5 gene cannot function in heart development, but still function fine
elsewhere. Thanks to Chelsea Brain for discussion on this.
11 Rarely can we isolate a single gene as responsible for a congenital heart defect, and so I note here that
much more complicated stories would need to be told if one were interested in how my account of function
would characterize human hearts with different defects, since human heart defects ‘are an etiologically
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example of mutations in a single gene causing abnormal hearts. However, in this case
we clearly have something fairly close to a functioning heart and fairly far away from
a glob of organic matter. To see this consider some of the macro-level consequences
of this syndrome. Transcription of TBX5 is Normally required for septal formation. If
this gene is defective, this does not completely destroy or eliminate cardiac function,
but merely impairs it. The heart is less effective at what is has been designed to do, but
it nevertheless continues to function as a heart in broad terms.12 Here we have just one
genewhich goes awry, this is the kind of case I envisage being characterized aswithin a
range considered a reasonable attempt to produce a heart. Thismeans that the defective
hearts of patients withHolt-Oram syndrome aremalfunctioning hearts, onmy account.
Satisfaction of (a) is not sufficient for membership of a functional kind—this is in
line with the historical theorist’s claim that an item’s history is necessary for function
ascription. If possession of a property in set S in (a) was sufficient, then, depending on
how we pinned down the nature of the set of intrinsic structural properties, we might
get function ascription for first traits (those which are not descendants of F-ers with
one of the properties causally responsible for the trait F-ing) and Swamp13 traits (those
possessed by the spontaneously coalescing creatures of philosophical thought exper-
iments). Condition (a) can be met by first traits and Swamp traits. When we step back
and look at all the traits which were associated with certain sets of gene expression,
first traits will be included in this set. As for Swamp traits, they too will meet condition
(a) understood in this sense (due to Swampman being a ‘physical replica’ of a biolog-
ical organism (Davidson 1987, 443)). So these traits may meet condition (a) (again
depending on how we spell out the nature of the set of intrinsic structural properties),
but in their failing to meet condition (b), they do not qualify as members of a given
functional kind. So they do not have functions, and thus they cannot malfunction.
A worry about condition (a) is that the requirement of a structural property may
actually be in tension with historical accounts, because proponents hold that history
is sufficient for function ascription. It is true that proponents of the selected functions
and weak etiological accounts have claimed that history is sufficient to determine
purposiveness and norms of performance. However, I think that the appeal to a struc-
tural property would not be rejected by historical theorists, since the history which is
claimed sufficient is a certain kind of history. A brief aside is needed here to defend
the claim that the requirement of possession of one of a set of intrinsic structural
properties (condition (a)) is not in tension with historical accounts.
Footnote 11 continued
heterogeneous collection of malformations, with overlapping genetic and environmental factors that con-
tribute to disease presentation’ (Moran and Robin 2013, p. 169). The genetic homogeneity of this syndrome
makes it an ideal one for my purposes, since it allows for a relatively simple explication of condition (a),
whilst still referring to a real example.
12 Thanks to Simon Barnes for discussion on this.
13 The Swampman thought experiment comes from Davidson (1987). Imagine that I, and a dead tree in
a swamp, get struck by lightning. My body is ‘reduced to its elements’, whilst the tree is turned into a
molecule for molecule identical version of me: Swamp Ema. If one is a historical theorist about function,
Swamp Ema’s blood-pumping organ is not a member of the functional kind heart and does not have the
function of pumping blood. This is because spontaneous coalescence is not the appropriate history for
function ascription.
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Millikan speaks of devices that are ‘similar to one another—as human hearts are
similar to one another’, (Millikan 1984, p. 18, my emphasis). In her definition of a
higher-order reproductively established family, as well of talking of ‘similar items’,
Millikan talks of traits being ‘in some respects like’Normal members of a given repro-
ductively established family (Millikan 1984, pp. 24–25, my emphasis). She claims that
the use of such terms (‘in some respects like’ and ‘approximates in some degree to a
Normal explanation’) reflects the vagueness of the question ‘whether a bit of matter
should be called “a malformed eye” or merely “a glob of misplaced organic matter on
the forehead”’ (Millikan 1984, p. 25).
Howmight we to understand what ‘similar’ and ‘in some respects like’ means here?
We should not cash out ‘similar’ by appeal to morphological properties, or disposi-
tional properties, because in doing so we cast our net too narrowly—we will exclude
malfunctioning traits from our functional categories, as well as traits which simply fail
to perform their functions in abNormal conditions. What we can do instead though, is
adopt my condition (a) on membership of a functional kind. This would cast the net
such that working and malfunctioning traits are distinguished from useless traits. The
vagueness Millikan refers to is the kind of vagueness which my condition (a) goes
some way to resolve. This is what I am up to when I offer condition (a) on membership
of a functional kind. This condition will demarcate working and malformed items of
a given trait type, from what I have called useless items.
Earlier I suggested that in cashing out condition (a) we might usefully think in
terms of reasonable departures from gene expression. Condition (a) demarcates those
working and defective traits from useless traits, with such categories being roughly
correlated with gene expression which falls into the range considered a reasonable
attempt to produce an item similar to ancestral items which performed F . This story
sit very well with Millikan’s claims, bearing ‘some resemblance’ and matching ‘in
some relevant respects’ can be cashed out in terms of producing an item within a
range considered a reasonable departure from the gene expression associated with
selectively successful ancestral tokens of the functional kinds.
Turning now to Price, a weak etiological theorist. She too indicates that the require-
ment of a structural property would not be unwelcome. When discussing Andrew
Woodfield’s (1976) account of function statements (what she calls an ‘Actual Capac-
ity Account’ (ACT)), she suggests that the ACT theorist should borrow a criterion
of Millikan’s, one which ‘focuses on the causal origin of the device: two devices
belong to the same group if they were produced by the same genetic mechanisms in
(more or less) the same way’ (Price 1995, p. 147, my emphasis). And, in a footnote
attached to this claim, Price claims that the ‘phrase “more or less” is needed to allow
for malformed devices’, a claim she attributes to Millikan (1984, p. 25) (Price 1995,
p. 147, fn. 9). In discussion of her own account, Price claims that ‘two devices will
count as belonging to the same type if they were produced by the second system, or
its ancestors, in more or less the same way’ (Price 1995, p. 151, my emphasis).
In later work, Price claims that ‘[a]n item will be equivalent to one of these earlier
items if it is causally related to [some token device] in much the same way as those
earlier items were related to earlier members of [some type device] that assisted them
to [perform some function]’ (Price 2001, p. 38, my emphasis). And in a footnote to
this claim she states that the ‘processes that produced my heart and my liver were
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related to each other in more or less the same way as the processes that produced my
ancestor’s heart and her liver’ (Price 2001, p. 38, fn. 5, my emphasis).
This ‘in much the same way’ and ‘more or less’ can be understood in my terms.
If two token traits were produced within an appropriate range of gene expression
associated with recent ancestral items which performed F , they are ‘produced by the
same genetic mechanisms in (more or less) the same way’ (Price 1995, p. 147, my
emphasis). They can also both be said to be ‘causally related to [some token device]
in much the same way as those earlier items were related to earlier members of [some
type device]’ (Price 2001, p. 38, my emphasis).
So requiring a structural property for membership of a functional kind would be
friendly to both selected functions and weak etiological accounts, and would help
pin down more precisely what Millikan14 and Price15 are getting at when they talk
in terms of items being ‘similar’ or produced ‘in more or less the same way’. It is
in bringing out and developing this underexplored commitment in the work of some
historical theorists that we can formulate a revised historical account of functionwhich
can accommodate malfunction. This is achieved by making explicit the requirement
of an intrinsic structural property in the conditions on functional kind membership.
Getting more specific about the kind of intrinsic structural property required is
tricky,16 and though I have offered a way historical theorists might go with regards to
this, it is inevitable that vagueness will arise. Though vagueness of this kind will infect
any account of biological function owing to borderline cases, and so it does not speak
against the conditions on function ascription I have offered. This is recognised—indeed
embraced—by historical theorists. Millikan claims that there ‘are lots of borderline
cases of proper function, if not somany in nature, certainly in possibleworlds (Millikan
2002, p. 115, fn. 2). When discussing the development of functional terms (‘Cummins
biofunction’ and ‘proper biofunction’) she suggests that we should ‘not attempt to
give these notions entirely clean boundaries. Nature has many important joints, but
these joints are seldom clean’ (Millikan 2002, p. 122, my emphasis). Similarly Price
claims that there ‘is nothing wrong with a certain amount of vagueness in our account
of functions provided we are clear about what is going on’ (Price 2001, p. 29, fn. 19).
14 Millikan does not think that malformed devices are terribly important to the historical theorist’s program
(see fn. 2), though she thinks we might account for a malformed device using the conditions I introduce
(personal correspondence).
15 Price agrees that appealing only to history will not do, and that we need another (merely necessary,
not sufficient) condition to meet Davies’s objection, though we should prioritize the historical condition
(personal correspondence). This is in line with what I have done. Condition (a) allows us to meet Davies’s
objection, whilst condition (b) is still necessary (and allows us to specify the function of a given trait
type). Price also she thinks that we ought to prioritize similarity of developmental process over similarity
of resulting product. I suspect those similarities might be roughly co-extensive—I doubt we would get a
useless glob if something were produced in a similar enough way to the way ancestral hearts were produced,
equally, I doubt we would get a heart, if the way in which it was produced was not similar to the way in
which hearts were produced. So, if one sympathises with Price on this point, I think condition (a) could be
cashed out in these terms; instead of requiring the possession of one of a set of intrinsic structural properties,
we might instead require that the item be produced within a range of ways considered a reasonable attempt
at producing an item which could perform F.
16 I am not seeking to give a definitive pinning down of condition (a) here, but only to argue that something
like condition (a) is necessary. I offer one way in which this might be done above.
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5.2 Condition (b)
Let us now look to (b). The three clauses in (b) are each doing important work, they
make specific the causal relationship required to hold between a present day token
and an ancestral token of a trait type, by requiring that the ancestral token satisfies
clauses [i], [ii], and [iii]. Let us first look to (b) [i]. Requiring the ancestral trait in the
causal-historical relation to possess one of a set S of intrinsic structural properties,
{p1, p2, p3, . . ., } rules out the possibility of functional kind membership for traits
which are descendants of something which performed F but are a different kind of
thing, for example, a blood-pumping pseudo-lung (note that I do not call it a lung
because biological kinds are typed by their functions). The property in (b) [ii] is the
success property, the property which allows the function to be performed, if a trait
has this property it is a member of Davies’s selected functional type. This clause is
important because there must be historical success for function attribution. Finally,
clause [iii] of (b) is present to reflect the selected functions theorist’s commitment to
the claim that variation is required for selection. That is, a trait has the function it does
because the historical performance of that function accounts for the trait’s presence in
the current population, ‘as over against historical alternative traits no longer present’
(Millikan 1993a, p. 40).
Importantly, meeting the three clauses in (b) is not sufficient for function attribution.
The historical connection to, for example, ancestral human hearts cannot be enough for
functional kind membership for at least two reasons. First, my lungs hold a historical
connection to ancestral hearts (since my ancestors had hearts), but that does not mean
that my lungs are part of the function kind heart and have pumping blood as their
proper function. Second, imagine the case in which something goes sowrong, that the
trait produced is a so-called useless one. The resulting product does not come close
to being a heart. These items are not malfunctioning items, but rather not functional
traits at all. Condition (a), the requirement of an intrinsic structural property, excludes
such items from the functional category.
In summing up the presentation of my position, it is important to note how I differ
from previous historical accounts of function. My account is very much influenced
by Millikan’s, and so I will note the ways in which I depart from her, especially with
respect to accommodating malfunction.
In her definitions of higher-order reproductively established familiesMillikan gives
a condition on membership to some functional kind R as its having ‘been produced
in accordance with an explanation that approximates in some (undefined) degree to
a Normal explanation for production of members of R’ (Millikan 1984, p. 25). She
wants tomake room formalformedmembers of R by appeal to this similarity condition
(though see fn. 2).
Inmy account, I make room formalfunction by appeal to a range of gene expression
associated with ancestral items which were selectively successful. This range captures
a set of otherwise heterogenous intrinsic structural properties, which includes work-
ing and defective items, and excludes useless items. Introducing the idea of functional
kinds being associated with sets of properties, allows functional kindhood to be mul-
tiply realizable by appeal to these sets of properties. Not every way of realizing some
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functional kind needs to be one which realizes it in virtue of being selectively suc-
cessful.
Here is a (rather dramatic and admittedly toy) casewheremy account andMillikan’s
license different judgements. Suppose radiation poisoning causes gene expression
which produces a heart which cannot perform the function of pumping blood with-
out artificial assistance. If that gene expression were within the range associated with
ancestral tokens of the functional kind heart, but the deviation from the ideal were
caused by radiation, my account has it that the resulting product would be a malfunc-
tioning heart. ForMillikan though the resulting product would not be amalfunctioning
heart, but a heart produced under abNormal conditions.17
MillikanianNormal conditions andNormal explanations are indexed to a distinctive
historical environment. In contrast, I place the emphasis on gene expression in an
environment which need not be a Normal one. My account is thus less relational
than Millikan’s. Her talk of items being produced in accordance with an explanation
that approximates a Normal explanation, raises the question of whether something
could be unable to perform its function in a given environment in a way which could
properly be described as malfunctioning as opposed to just failure to perform (hence
why Millikan is doubtful about putative cases of malfunction, see fn. 2). If one is
committed, as Millikan is, to restricting cases of malfunction to ones in which the
item is produced in accordance with an explanation which approximates a Normal
one, malfunction will be very rare indeed. I am not committed to such a restriction.
5.3 The possibility of selected malfunction
If the selected functions theorist adopts my proposal, she can now meet Davies’s
objection by reading ‘tokens of T’ in conditions (i)–(v) as follows:
(i) Past instances of tokens of the selected functional type in O performed F in E,
(ii) The selected functional type was heritable,
(iii) Past performances of F caused an increase in O’s relative ability to satisfy
demands of E (relative to other organisms in the population which do not have
tokens of the selected functional type),
(iv) This increase in O’s ability to satisfy selective demands of E resulted in an
increase in O’s long-term relative rate of reproduction,
(v) This increase in relative reproduction resulted in the persistence or proliferation
of O and hence tokens of the historical trait type.
Though the referent of ‘T’ changes between conditions (i)–(iv) and condition (v), this
is unproblematic. This is because now, the selected functions account has it that the suc-
cess of members of the selected functional type resulted in tokens of the historical trait
type. And tokens of the historical trait type can malfunction, because (a) they possess
one of a set of intrinsic structural properties, and (b) they are governed by the norms
of performance bestowed on them by their historical connection to prior successful
17 Thank you to Paul Noordhof for suggesting this example as illuminative of one of the differences
between my account and Millikan’s.
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tokens of the generic trait type to which they belong. As long as a trait is part of the
historical trait type, then the norms of performance apply to it, and it can malfunction.
To be clear: I conceded thatDavies has shown that the referent of tokens of ‘T’ needs
to be such that equivocation is avoided. I suggested that equivocation can be avoided
by appealing to the historical trait type, members of which meet my conditions (a)
and (b) on function ascription. My response is to the charge that historical accounts
do not have the internal resources to account for malfunction. Davies thinks that the
referent of ‘T’ throughout conditions (i)–(v) should be the selected functional type.
The historical theorist need not accept this proposal. Rather, the success of members
of the selected functional type can result in members of the historical trait type without
equivocation. This revised selected functions account can accommodate malfunction.
6 The supposed impossibility of weak etiological malfunction
Theweak etiological account of biological function differs from the selected functions
account in that variation during the period in which a trait contributes to organismic
fitness is not a necessary condition on function possession. That is, a trait T can have
the function to F providing ‘T contributed to the fitness of the ancestors of T ’s current
bearers by producing an effect E and that this, in turn, contributed to the reproduction
of T s’ (Buller 1998, p. 508). The weak etiological account then is more liberal than
the selected functions account, which requires variation for function ascription. On
the selected functions account, as we have seen, for a trait t to have the function of
F-ing, ‘an itemmust not just contribute to survival or reproduction, itmust contribute to
reproduction better than some alternative item, that is, it must contribute to differential
reproductive success or fitness’ (McLaughlin 2001, p. 106).
Davies formulates the weak etiological account thus,
A token of trait T has weak etiological function F if and only if (1) ancestors of
this token contributed to some component of organismic fitness by performing
F and (2) T was heritable. (Davies 2000, p. 33)
Davies suggests that the eschewal of the appeal to selection ‘may give the appearance
that [his] argument [...] does not apply to the theory of weak etiological functions’
(Davies 2000, p. 34). However given certain adjustments, the argument applies here
also. The adjustment is to cast the argument not in terms of selective success as before,
but more generally in terms of properties of historical success (Davies 2000, p. 34).
Even though for the weak etiological theorist variation is not necessary for func-
tional kind membership, for any case, there either was variation among ancestral
instances of the trait in question, or there was not variation. Davies argues that
whichever is the case, his objection goes through. If there was variation, the weak
etiological functional category gets defined by reference to the successful variants
that contributed to ancestral fitness by performing F . So, as before, if a present day
token does not possess the capacity to perform F due to defect, disease, or damage,
that token is not a member of the functional kind, and so it cannot malfunction. If there
was not variation, the objection still goes through. Davies supposes that ‘not a single
variant was sufficiently defective, diseased, or damaged to prevent it from contributing
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to fitness’ (Davies 2000, p. 34). Now the weak etiological functional category gets
defined by reference to the tokens that contributed to ancestral fitness by doing F , in
this case it just so happens to be all ancestral tokens. But again, present day tokens
which lack the capacity to perform F , do not count as members of the functional type.
So weak etiological malfunctions, as well as selected malfunctions, are impossible
(Davies 2000, p. 34).
7 The possibility of weak etiological malfunction
The weak etiological theorist can respond in much the same way as the selected
functions theorist did. Therewill be a change in the formulation to reflect the difference
between the accounts. My proposal for a revised weak etiological account is the
following: a token trait t is a member of the functional kind K and has F-ing as its
selected function if and only if it:
(a) Possesses one of a set S of intrinsic structural properties, {p1, p2, p3, . . ., }
(b) Stands in a causal historical relationship to at least one token trait which,
i. possessedoneof a set S of intrinsic structural properties, {p1, p2, p3, . . ., }
ii. possessed one of a set S∗ of properties responsible for that token trait
F-ing {q1, q2, q3, . . ., }
iii. contributed—by F-ing—to some component of organismic fitness.
The only difference between this formulation and the one offered earlier is in condition
(b [iii]). The earlier formulation had as (b [iii]) ‘was selected for F-ing’, making it a
condition on functional kind membership that a trait was descended from a trait which
was selected for, where being selected for requires variation among ancestral traits.
As we have seen though, the weak etiological account does not require this sense of
selection for function attribution, it requires something much weaker, namely, a trait’s
having contributed—by F-ing—to some component of organismic fitness, and it is
this requirement that constitutes clause [iii] in (b).
Again, call the traits which meet conditions (a) and (b) members of the his-
torical trait type. Membership of a functional kind is not defined by reference to
tokens which contribute to fitness but rather, as with the selected functions account,
is defined by reference to traits which met conditions (a) and (b). The weak eti-
ological account now has it that success of members of the selected functional
type—those members which contributed to organismic fitness—resulted in tokens
which are members of the historical trait type. And, once again, tokens of the his-
torical trait type can malfunction, because (a) they possess one of a set of intrinsic
structural properties, and (b) they are governed by norms of performance bestowed on
them by their historical connection to prior tokens of the generic trait type to which
they belong which contributed to organismic fitness. If a trait is a member of the
historical trait type, then it can malfunction in virtue of there being norms of perfor-
mance which apply to it. This revised weak etiological account can also accommodate
malfunction.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper I have done three things. First, I have shown that the scope of Davies’s
objection is limited—some historical malfunctions survive unscathed. Second, I
argued that the objection can be answered by my revised historical account. Third, I
identified a component of historical theories which have escaped attention. Once that
component is brought to the fore, Davies’s challenge can be met by a revised historical
account. I proposed a new account according to which there are two conditions on
membership of a functional kind. If the historical theorist adopts these conditions, she
does not have to accept that functional kinds are defined by reference to successful
tokens, it was this which made her account vulnerable to Davies’s objection. Rather
she can hold on to the historical component of her account—it is after all by reference
to a token trait’s history that a specific function can be specified—and, by adding
the requirement of an intrinsic structural property to the conditions on membership
of a functional kind, she can distinguish malfunctioning tokens of a given type from
so-called useless ones. As I noted at the start of the paper, my aim here has not been
to give an account of malfunctions which Davies would accept, since he would not
accept any account of malfunction, on the grounds that no account is required. I con-
clude then that Davies’s challenge can be met by my historical account of biological
functions, and that historical malfunctions—of both the selected and weak etiological
kind—are possible.
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